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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Thomas D. Lowder

Statement

Of The

Facts

challenges the district court’s denial 0f his motion to suppress.

And Course Of The Proceedings

Deputy Chad Payne was

travelling

westbound during daylight hours When he passed a

vehicle travelling eastbound. (TL, p.7, Ls.8-9, 15-16.1) Deputy Payne did not see a license plate

0n the

front

of the vehicle 0r in the Windshield. (Tn,

p.7, Ls.9-1

1

;

p.8, Ls.9-18.) After seeing the

vehicle had an Idaho rear license plate, Deputy Payne conducted a trafﬁc stop for not having a

front license plate. (Tr., p.7, Ls.12-14; p.8, Ls.23-24.)

Deputy Payne approached the vehicle and

made

contact With the driver, Lowder.

—

saw a

license plate in the Windshield. (TL, p.9, Ls.15-18.)

any means”
p.10, L.25

on the

that

Deputy Payne could see but was

— p.1 1,

front

L. 10.)

Lowder commented

of the vehicle but he had zip

Ls.4-10; p.29, L.24

— p.30,

was suspended. (TL,

p.1

and discovered an active

1

1,

ties

t0

p.9, L.1.)

The

At

that point,

license plate

Deputy Payne

was “not secured by

“just laying in the front windshield area.” (TL,

Deputy Payne

and would get

it

that

ﬁxed

he didn’t have a license plate
as

soon as possible. (TL,

p.9,

L.2.)

Lowder provided an

L.2.)

(TL, p.8, L.25

out-of-state identiﬁcation card

Ls. 14-16.)

and he told Deputy Payne

Deputy Payne conﬁrmed Lowder’s

arrest warrant for

Deputy Payne placed Lowder under

license

Lowder out of Ada County. (TL,
arrest.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.9-15.)

p.1

his license

was suspended
1,

L.20 — p.12,

Pursuant to a search

Citations t0 “Tr.” refer t0 the September 9,

2019 transcript 0f the motion t0 suppress hearing,
Which appears 0n pages 10-23 of the Transcripts Volume 1 electronic document, and uses the
transcript’s internal pagination. A11 other transcripts will

be referred to by

date.

incident

to

methamphetamine

The

Deputy Payne found a straw

arrest,

state

in

Lowder’s

in

Lowder’s pocket and a baggie 0f

wallet. (TL, p. 12, Ls.23-25.)

charged Lowder with felony possession of a controlled substance and

misdemeanor driving Without

privileges.

evidence, asserting the trafﬁc stop

Lowder moved

pp.18—19.)

(R.,

was an unlawful

seizure.

to

suppress

(R., pp.27-39.) Speciﬁcally,

all

Lowder

argued his license plate’s location in the front Windshield satisﬁed the requirements 0f Idaho

Code

§

49-428(2); alternatively, he argued the statute

The

(R., pp.32-39.)

state objected to

was

unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Lowder’s motion, arguing he was in Violation of the clear

requirements 0f LC. § 49-428(2); additionally, the state argued the evidence was sufﬁciently
attenuated from the allegedly unlawful trafﬁc stop

for

Lowder’s

suppress, at

The

(Supp. R., pp.1-4.)

arrest.

The

by Deputy Payne’s discovery 0f the warrant

district court

which Deputy Payne and Lowder testiﬁed.
district court

held a hearing on the motion to

(E R., pp.40-41

.)

denied Lowder’s motion to suppress. (R., p.63.)

First, the district court

determined the statute requires that a license plate be secured t0 the front 0f a vehicle and be
Visible

from 75

Where the

plate

Ls.22-24.)

The

feet

from the

must be

front.

(T12, p.39,

attached, the plate

district court

Ls.18-22.)

Although the

must be securely fastened

found the license

plate,

p.40, Ls.7-9.)

The

district court also

was not

Thus, the

district court

to the vehicle.

(TL, p.39,

clearly Visible

statute.

from 75

feet

(Tr., p.40, Ls.5-7.)

from the

front.

(TL,

found the plate’s location “obscures a substantial portion of

the license plate,” as depicted in a photograph

4; EX., p.3.)

does not say

which was tucked between the windshield

and the dashboard, was not securely fastened as required by the
Further, the district court found the plate

statute

Lowder introduced

at the hearing.

(T12, p.40, Ls.1-

denied Lowder’s motion t0 suppress. (TL, p.40, Ls.10-14.)

Lowder entered

a conditional guilty plea t0 possession 0f a controlled substance,

speciﬁcally reserving his right to appeal the district court’s denial 0f his motion to suppress. (R.,

pp.44-52; 10/7/2019 Tr., p.11, L.18

privileges charge.

(R., pp.59-61.)

—

The

year ﬁxed and suspended the sentence.
appeal. (R., pp.65-66.)

p.12, L.15.)

district court

The

state

dismissed the driving Without

sentenced Lowder t0 three years With one

(Supp. R., pp.1 1-13.)

Lowder ﬁled a timely

notice of

ISSJ
Lowder

states the issue

Did the

district court err

on appeal

When

it

as:

denied Mr. Lowder’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p5.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Lowder
suppress?

failed t0

show

that the district court erred

When

it

denied his motion t0

ARGUMENT
Lowder Has Failed To Show That The

District

Court Erred

When It Denied His Motion To

Suppress

A.

Introduction

Lowder argues

“Deputy Payne did not have reasonable suspicion
front license plate

Lowder argued

trafﬁc stop

Because

it

denied his motion t0 suppress because

to continue the trafﬁc stop

on Mr. Lowder’s van was secured and

pp.6-14.) This claim fails

court,

When

that the district court erred

on several

fronts.

First, this

that the initial trafﬁc stop

clearly Visible.”

claim

new

claim was not

made below,

is

(Appellant’s brief,

unpreserved. Before the district

was unlawful. Now, Lowder

was unlawfully prolonged once Deputy Payne saw

this

once he saw that the

it

is

asserts that the

the license plate in the windshield.

not properly before this Court 0n appeal.

Second, Deputy Payne had reasonable suspicion that Lowder was driving in Violation of trafﬁc
laws.

It is

undisputed that Deputy Payne could not see the front license plate

the trafﬁc stop. Further, the license plate

required

by

the statute,

Where

the district court did not err

Alternatively,

it

was

it

§

(Appellant’s brief, pp.14-17.) This argument

Lowder was
t0

clearly

the Windshield and dash. Therefore,

concluded the trafﬁc stop was lawful.

Lowder argues LC.

license plate be “securely fastened”

initiated

neither “securely fastened” nor “clearly Visible” as

was merely tucked between

when

when he

49-428(2)

is

is

unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Without merit. The statute plainly requires that a

and “clearly Visible”; Lowder’s plate was

aware that he was not in compliance With the

statute.

neither.

Thus, there

Moreover,
is

no basis

conclude the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Even

if

this

Court

determines

the

trafﬁc

unconstitutionally vague as applied, suppression

is

stop

was unlawful or

not warranted.

Lowder was

the

statute

is

arrested pursuant

and evidence was found pursuant

t0 a valid pre-existing arrest warrant

to that arrest.

stop and

is

Thus, the evidence

sufﬁciently attenuated from the allegedly unlawful trafﬁc

not subject t0 suppression.

Standard

B.

is

Of Review

The standard of review 0f a suppression motion
motion
are

to a lawful search incident

is

bifurcated.

When

to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

a decision 0n a

ﬁndings 0f fact that

supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application 0f constitutional

principles t0 those facts.

State V. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240,

1242 (2006). “At

a suppression hearing, the power t0 assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts,

weigh evidence, and draw

factual inferences

is

vested in the

trial

court.”

State V. Pieper, 163

Idaho 732, 734, 418 P.3d 1241, 1243 (Ct. App. 2018).
“This

application.”

Court exercises

free

review over questions

of statutory interpretation and

State V. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106, 343 P.3d 1110, 1113 (2015).

criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague are reviewed de nova.”

305, 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019).

“A

party claiming a statute

is

State V.

Cook, 165 Idaho

unconstitutional

must overcome a

strong presumption 0f validity.” Li. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

is

“[C]laims that

“obligated t0 seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds

its

Further, this Court

constitutionality.”

Li

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

C.

The

District

Court Did Not Err

When It Denied Lowder’s Motion To

“Trafﬁc stops constitute seizures under the Fourth Amendment.”
Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007).

Suppress

State V. Henage, 143

“Under the Fourth Amendment, an ofﬁcer may stop a

vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there

is

a reasonable and articulable suspicion

that the vehicle is being driven contrary to trafﬁc laws.”

P.3d 220, 223

based 0n the

(Ct.

State V.

Still,

App. 2019). Whether an ofﬁcer possessed reasonable suspicion

totality

of the circumstances known to the ofﬁcer

State V. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811,

at or

_, 458

166 Idaho 351,

is

evaluated

before the time of the stop.

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2008); State

V.

Sheldon, 139 Idaho

980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on speciﬁc,

articulable facts

and the rational inferences

that

can be drawn from those

facts.”

State V. Fuller,

163 Idaho 585, 588, 416 P.3d 957, 960 (2018) (internal quotation omitted).

Lowder Concedes The Initial Trafﬁc Stop Was Lawful And His New Claim That
The Stop Was Unlawfullv Prolonged Is Not Preserved For Appeal

1.

“Issues not raised

Will

be held

t0 the theory

below

will not be considered

upon Which

the case

by

was presented

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).

and the party’s position 0n the issue
preserved for appeal.”

it

t0 the

be raised before the

making a decision 0n an

did not have the opportunity t0 address.”

on appeal, and the

lower court.” State

V.

parties

Garcia-

This Court requires “both the issue

State V. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 672,

will not hold that a trial court erred in

issue that

[to]

this court

trial

court for

it

to

be properly

450 P.3d 315, 320 (2019).

“We

issue or a party’s position

0n an

State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99,

439

P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019).
Before the

district court,

Lowder argued

that the initial trafﬁc stop

pp.32-36 (“Corporal Payne lacked probable cause to

However, on appeal Lowder has changed
trafﬁc stop

was lawful but argues

license plate

his position.

the stop

was unlawful.

initiate a trafﬁc stop.”

He now

(E R.,

(emphasis added)).)

appears to concede that the

initial

was unlawfully prolonged once Deputy Payne saw

upon making contact with Lowder

(“Deputy Payne did not have reasonable suspicion

at the vehicle.

t0

(E

the

Appellant’s brief, p.6

continue the trafﬁc stop.

.

..”);

p.7 (“Deputy

Payne Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion For The Trafﬁc Stop Once
plate); p.13

He Saw”

the license

(“Deputy Payne n0 longer had a lawful basis to continue the trafﬁc stop once he saw

the front license plate in Mr. Lowder’s van”); p.14 (arguing the evidence

was obtained from

‘jarolonging the trafﬁc stop Without reasonable suspicion”) (emphases added).)

Lowder’s new position concedes the
stop

was

lawful.

district court

did not err in determining the trafﬁc

Although he disputes his license plate was not “securely fastened” or “clearly

Visible” Within the

meaning of the

could not see the license plate

statute,

when he

Lowder does not challenge

initiated the trafﬁc stop.

the fact that

Deputy Payne

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.7-14.)

His argument that the stop was unlawﬁllly prolonged and Deputy Payne “n0 longer” had a basis
t0 detain

him once Deputy Payne saw

at the side

of the vehicle

is

making contact With Lowder

a concession that the initial trafﬁc stop

was supported by reasonable

suspicion and therefore not unlawful.

on

Window

after

the plate in the

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14.)

This Court could afﬁrm

this basis.

Further, this Court should decline t0 address

was unlawfully prolonged. The
stop

was

lawful;

it

district court

was never asked

was asked

t0 determine

answer

Lowder’s new argument
to determine

that the trafﬁc stop

Whether the

initial trafﬁc

Whether an otherwise lawful trafﬁc stop was

Because Lowder did not

unlawfully extended, nor did

it

the district court below,

not properly preserved for appeal and this Court should decline t0

address

erred in

it.

E

it is

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho

making a decision on an

opportunity t0 address”).

that question.

at 99,

439 P.3d

at

raise this claim to

1271 (“We Will not hold that a

issue or a party’s position

0n an issue

that

it

trial

court

did not have the

Deputy Payne Had Reasonable Suspicion That Lowder’s Plate Was Neither
Securely Fastened Nor Clearly Visible As Required BV I.C. 6 49-4280)

2.

The

district court

did not err

Lowder’s Violation 0f Idaho Code

Every license plate
is

when

it

§ 49-428(2).

shall at all times

determined the trafﬁc stop was lawful based 0n

That provision

states:

be securely fastened t0 the vehicle t0 Which

assigned t0 prevent the plate from swinging, be

at

it

a height not less than twelve

(12) inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom 0f the plate, be in a place

and position

t0

be clearly

and

Visible,

shall

be maintained

materials and in a condition to be clearly legible, and

be securely attached to the plates and

shall

all

free

from foreign

registration stickers shall

be displayed as provided in section 49-

443(4), Idaho Code.

LC.

Lowder’s license plate was positioned between the dashboard and the

49-428(2).

§

windshield of the vehicle?

The question before

Court

this

Payne had reasonable suspicion
speciﬁcally I.C. § 49-428(2),

is

Whether the

that the vehicle

when he

district court

was being driven

initiated the trafﬁc stop.

“A

properly determined Deputy

in Violation

determination that reasonable

suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility 0f innocent conduct.”

Idaho 336, 429 P.3d 877, 883 (Ct. App. 2018); State

459 (2020). Thus,

this

V.

of trafﬁc laws,

State V. Fairchild, 164

Bonner, 167 Idaho 88,

_, 467 P.3d 452,

Court need not decide whether the license plate’s placement ultimately

violated the “securely fastened” or “clearly Visible” requirements of the statute, but instead

Whether Deputy Payne reasonably suspected as much based on the speciﬁc, articulable
totality

2

0f the circumstances known t0 him

Although not binding 0n
scenario

factual

found

at the

a

license

plate

vehicle. .Violated both the ‘securely fastened”
.

United States

2019)

V.

and

“positioned

applying this statute to a similar
in

the

front

WL 2997775,

at

Window of

the

0f § 49-428(2).”
*4 (D. Idaho July 9,

‘clearly Visible’ requirements

Behrens, N0. 1:19-CR-0044-BLW, 2019

(slip opinion).

and

time of the stop.

this Court, a federal district court

that

facts

Deputy Payne’s unchallenged testimony established
front license plate

plate

when he passed

was from Idaho, and he was

front license plate.

It is

it

on the roadway.

therefore subject to LC. § 49-428(2) and required t0 display a

also undisputed

Deputy Payne

initiated the trafﬁc stop

was from

conﬁrming the back

Deputy Payne

time—that the vehicle was required

plate

was not Visible—Deputy Payne reasonably suspected
trafﬁc laws. Thus, the trafﬁc stop

undisputed that Lowder’s back license

It is

plate Violation after

at the

he could not see the vehicle’s

that

was

based on the front

Based 0n the

Idaho.

facts

known

to display a front license plate but

the vehicle

was being driven

to

one

in Violation

of

lawful.

Court addresses Lowder’s newly raised argument that the trafﬁc stop was

If this

unlawfully extended once Deputy Payne approached the vehicle and saw the license plate, that

argument

As Lowder now

fails.

appears to concede, the

Deputy Payne could not see Lowder’s

front license plate

initial

from

its

trafﬁc stop

was lawful because

position in the

Window When he

passed the vehicle, and therefore he had reasonable suspicion to believe the vehicle was being
driven in Violation of trafﬁc laws and conduct the trafﬁc stop. That reasonable suspicion did not

dissipate

when Deputy Payne approached Lowder’s

Window. Seeing the

plate in the

that the plate could not

Window from

vehicle and

saw the

that vantage point did not

license plate in the

somehow

cure the fact

be seen by Deputy Lowder from his patrol vehicle when passing Lowder

0n the roadway.

The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed a
Idaho 763, 391 P.3d 21 (Ct. App. 2017).

was unable

There, the ofﬁcer conducted a trafﬁc stop because he

t0 read a vehicle’s license plate

plate’s digits.

Li. at

vehicle, the ofﬁcer

similar circumstance in State V. Tregeagle, 161

due

764-65, 391 P.3d at 22-23.

came within

t0 a trailer ball hitch obstructing

After initiating the stop and exiting his patrol

ten feet 0f the vehicle and could read the plate in

10

two 0f the

its entirety.

Li.

at

765, 391 P.3d at 23. Despite the ofﬁcer’s ability t0 read the license plate from ten feet away,

the Court of Appeals held the trafﬁc stop

was nonetheless lawful because

obstructed the plate in Violation of the statute.

Deputy Payne’s

Li. at 767,

ability to see the license plate after

391 P.3d

the trailer ball hitch

at 25.

As

in Tregeagle,

conducting the stop and approaching the

vehicle did not dispel the reasonable suspicion for the trafﬁc stop because the plate

Visible

from

his patrol vehicle.

Further, the district court ﬁndings that

Lowder’s front plate was neither securely fastened

nor clearly Visible are supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous. The

ﬁnding

was not

that the plate

“was not securely attached”

district court’s

to the vehicle, (Tr., p.40, Ls.5-7), is supported

by the testimony of both Deputy Payne and Lowder. Deputy Payne

testiﬁed the license plate

was

“not secured by any means” he could see, but was “just laying in the front windshield area.” (TL,
p.10, L.25

in

— p.1 1,

L. 10.)

Lowder

testiﬁed the license plate

was “[s]hoved down

between the Window and the dash.” (TL, p.33, Ls.7-8.) Lowder offered

apple at one point holding

However, when asked
vehicle,

up, too, so

directly

Lowder conceded

p.34, Ls.16-18.)

it

was

against the windshield.”

the plate

was not securely

was not “securely fastened”

Lowder argues he complied With
was “[s]hoved down

swinging, citing State

V.

window

that “there

was an

(TL, p.33, Ls.8-10.)

Whether “anything was used t0 fasten” the license plate t0 the
fastened, answering simply “N0.”

Because the license plate was not fastened or attached

secure means, the plate

plate

it

into the

into the

to the vehicle

(TL,

by any

t0 the vehicle.

the “securely fastened” requirement because the license

window

in

between the window and the dash” and was not

Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 218 P.3d 10 (Ct. App. 2009). (Appellant’s brief,

pp.9-11 (quoting Tr., p.33, Ls.7-8).)

First,

Lowder overlooks

his

own

testimony, in which he

conceded the plate was not securely fastened to the vehicle by any means.
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(E

Tr., p.34,

Ls.16-

18.)

Second, the Ma_rtin’s discussion focused on the “so as t0 prevent the plate from swinging”

language because that was the factual issue presented in that case; the vehicle’s license plate was
secured by only one bolt and had swung

down

t0

an angle, Which the Court of Appeals held was

a Violation of the statute. Li. at 35-36, 218 P.3d at 14-15. The court did not hold that the statute

could only be violated where a plate was swinging or in a position to swing.

Applying the

language that Ma_rtin determined was plain and unambiguous, the statute requires a plate t0 be

As Lowder conceded below,

securely fastened t0 the front 0f the vehicle.

Second, the

district court’s

ﬁnding

was not

opposite direction 0n the roadway and

came Within 75

into the vehicle

the vehicle at

As

as

it

the vehicle got closer,

that

it

0r in the windshield.” (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-3, 16-18.)

time of the stop and

When

I

was

ﬁrst observing the vehicle,

by

travelled the

I

didn’t have a

Deputy Payne was able

and identify the driver as a male, but he “did not see a license plate

all

not.

(E TL, p.7, Ls.8-16; p.8, Ls.19-

feet.

Deputy Payne testiﬁed he “watched the vehicle approach and noticed

front license plate.” (TL, p.7, Ls.9-1 1.)

was

clearly Visible is supported

Deputy Payne saw Lowder’s vehicle during daylight hours

the evidence.

22.)

that the plate

his plate

Deputy Payne

to see

in the front

testiﬁed:

0f

“At the

did not see [a license plate] in the

windshield” despite looking in the path of the driver and being able to see and identify him as a
male.

(TL, p.9, Ls.16-21.)

vehicle, approached

It

was not

it

was not

Lowder

Deputy Payne

initiated the stop, exited his patrol

Lowder’s vehicle, and made contact with Lowder

front license plate in the windshield.

not be seen,

until

that

he was able t0 see the

(TL, p.9, Ls.15-16.) Because Lowder’s license plate could

“clearly Visible.”

asserts the district court misinterpreted “clearly Visible” as requiring the plate t0

be Visible from 75

feet

away.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)

Lowder goes on

“proper” interpretation of clearly Visible based on the plain language and

12

its

to set forth the

ordinary meaning:

“Visible

means ‘capable 0f being

seen,’ ‘perceptible

a clear manner,’ ‘without doubt or question.

Idaho

at

767, 391 P.3d at 25).)

Lowder has

3”

Vision,’ ‘easily seen.’

by

Clearly

means

‘in

(Appellant’s brief, p.12 (quoting Tregeagle, 161

failed t0

show

error.

Idaho Code § 49-443(1) sets forth the requirements for Idaho-issued license plates, Which
includes the requirement that the plate and lettering “be 0f sufﬁcient size t0 be plainly readable

from a distance of seventy—ﬁve (75)
plate

was

required

was an

(E

standard-issued.

by

Appellant’s brief, p.11.)

was capable of being seen from a

statute,

issue caused

feet during daylight.”

by Lowder’s placement 0f the

The evidence demonstrates

that

clear manner.3

As

points out, his license

Thus, because the plate

distance of 75 feet, the lack of Visibility

plate.

feet

away, nor was

it

capable 0f being seen in a

away

in

broad daylight. Even from within 75

feet,

from Which distance he

could clearly see the driver of the vehicle was male, he could not see the license plate.
not see the license plate at any point up until he

Lowder has not challenged

being seen,

” “

as

discussed above, Deputy Payne could not see the license plate from his patrol

vehicle from 75 feet

vehicle.

itself,

Lowder’s standard Idaho-issued license plate was not

from 75

clearly Visible—it could not be seen

As Lowder

perceptible

by

Vision,’

made

that testimony.

’

or “easily seen

contact with

Lowder

Therefore, the plate
79

‘6'

1n a clear

manner

at the

He

could

Window of the

was not “capable 0f
79

‘6

without doubt or

question,” from Within 0r Without 75 feet.

3

Lowder does not challenge

the district court’s ﬁnding that the placement of the license plate

tucked into the windshield “obscures a substantial portion of the license plate.” (TL, p.40, Ls.14.) He has therefore waived that argument and this Court could uphold the district court’s order

0n

that basis.

ﬂ

Bettwieser V.

New York

Irrigation Dist,

154 Idaho 317, 323, 297 P.3d 1134,

1140 (2013) (holding issue not raised in opening brief is waived).
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Lowder

summarily asserting

clearly erroneous,

plate

was

ﬁnding

also argues the district court’s

that

was not

that the plate

“Defense Exhibit

1

clearly Visible 75 feet away.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1 1.)

clearly Visible is

demonstrates that the license

Lowder

is

incorrect; Exhibit

1

demonstrates the opposite. Lowder attached a picture 0f the vehicle with the license plate in the

windshield along with his motion to suppress.4 (R., p.3 1 .) In that picture, the plate can barely be
seen.

Thus,

at the

hearing 0n the motion t0 suppress,

version of the picture

zoomed

in

Lowder introduced Exhibit l—an

0n the Windshield and license

conceded the plate was not clearly Visible in the original

from the vehicle.

(ﬂ

Tr., p.32,

L.16 — p.33, L.1.)

He

(E EX., p.3.)

plate.

picture, taken

edited

Lowder

an estimated 25-30 feet

testiﬁed that the zoomed-in version

was

necessary because “you couldn’t see [the license plate] clearly” in the original picture. (TL, p.32,
Ls.16-18.)

Thus, the

district court’s factual

ﬁnding

supported by the very evidence t0 Which Lowder

that the plate

clearly Visible is

cites.

Lowder Has Failed T0 Show That Idaho Code

D.

was not

S

49-4280)

Is

Unconstitutionallv

Vague

As Applied
Lowder’s alternative argument that the
fails.

There

is

statute is unconstitutionally

a strong presumption of statutory validity and this Court

interpretation of a statute that upholds

881 (quotation marks omitted).

its

“obligated t0 seek an

constitutionality.” Co_0k, 165 Idaho at 309,

In the absence 0f a legislative deﬁnition, the

should be given their “commonly understood, everyday meanings.”
doctrine “requires that a statute deﬁning criminal conduct be

4

is

vague as applied also

Li The

444 P.3d

words 0f a

at

statute

void-for-Vagueness

worded with sufﬁcient

clarity

and

After Lowder’s arrest, his father picked up the vehicle and was involved in a car accident; the

picture

depicts

was taken
where the

was attached

after that accident.

license plate

at the

was

time 0f the stop.

(m

Tr., p.18,

L.4 — p.19, L.15.)

located, the vehicle

(E

Tr., p.24, Ls.6-8.)
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Although

was not damaged and

it

accurately

the front

bumper

deﬁniteness that ordinary people can understand What conduct

is

prohibited and that the statute

be worded in a manner that does not allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

“To succeed 0n an

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

complainant must show that the
fair notice that the

statute, as

defendant’s conduct

Li.

‘as—applied’ vagueness challenge, a

applied t0 the defendant’s conduct, failed to provide

was proscribed 0r

failed to provide sufﬁcient guidelines

such that the police had unbridled discretion in determining Whether t0 arrest him.”

138 Idaho 706, 712, 69 P.3d 126, 132 (2003),

(alteration omitted) (quoting State V. Korsen,

abrogated on other grounds by Evans

Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013)).

V.

Li.

In analyzing

vagueness, the statutory language should be evaluated in reference t0 the defendant’s conduct.

Li.

The

relevant portion 0f LC. § 49-428(2) states: “Every license plate shall at

securely fastened t0 the vehicle to Which

in a place

and

and position

in a condition to

t0

be clearly

times be

assigned t0 prevent the plate from swinging,

it is

and

Visible,

all

shall

.

.

.

be

be maintained free from foreign materials

be clearly legible.” The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that

this statutory

provision “deﬁnes criminal conduct With sufﬁcient clarity and deﬁniteness that ordinary people

can understand What conduct
for arbitrary

is

prohibited and that

and discriminatory enforcement.”

it is

worded

Ma_rtin,

in a

148 Idaho

manner
at 36,

that does not allow

218 P.3d

at 15.

In

separate cases, the Court of Appeals has determined that both the “securely fastened” and

“clearly Visible”

requirements of LC.

§

49-428(2) are clear and unambiguous.

(addressing “securely fastened” requirement);

ﬂ alﬂ

mQ

Tregeagle, 161 Idaho at 767, 391 P.3d at

25 (addressing “clearly Visible” requirement).
In

Martin,

the

Court of Appeals held the “securely fastened” language was not

unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant, where the defendant’s license plate

15

was

by only one

attached to the front of the vehicle

at 36,

218 P.3d

and hanging

bolt

at

an angle. Ma_rtin, 148 Idaho

Although that case addressed the “securely fastened” requirement in the

at 15.

context 0f a swinging license plate,

it

nonetheless recognized “[t]he plain and obvious meaning”

of the statutory language required the license plate be attached t0 the vehicle by some secure

mechanism

that

would prevent

the plate

Similarly, in Tregeagle the Court of

statute is

means ‘capable of being

must be

“As such, a

from view,”

9

license plate

such as by a

at

767, 391 P.3d at 25.

and a position

in a place

seen,” ‘perceptible

manner,’ ‘Without doubt or question.”

1993)).

Appeals held the “clearly Visible” language of the

“unambiguous.” Tregeagle, 161 Idaho

statute indicates a license plate

EQ

from moving.

by

be clearly

Webster’s Third

in a place that results in

trailer ball hitch

plain reading of the

Vision,” ‘easily seen.” Clearly

Li. (quoting

mounted

t0

“A

Which obscured two

it

New

Visible. Visible

means

Int’l.

‘in a clear

Dict. (3d ed.

being partially obstructed

digits

of the license

plate,

“violates the ‘clearly Visible’ requirement of I.C. § 49-428(2).” Li.

Further, this Court has favorably discussed the clarity of § 49-428(2)

a different statutory provision as unconstitutionally vague.

882.

M,

when

165 Idaho

at

striking

down

310, 444 P.3d at

This Court determined the temporary registration provision at issue in that case did “not

provide similar specificity” to the language 0f § 49-428(2).
Visible”

and “free from foreign materials” language

432(4)’s

“may be

conduct.

Li Thus,

t0 include similar

readily legible” language, and

this

Court held

§

Li.

This Court noted the “clearly

in § 49-428(2) is

much

clearer than § 49-

would apprise a motorist of

the proscribed

49-432(4) was unconstitutionally vague based on

its

failure

language to that used in § 49-428(2).

Idaho Code

§

49-428(2)

is

not unconstitutionally vague as applied t0 Lowder’s conduct.

The plain meaning of the phrase “securely fastened”

16

requires the license plate be attached t0 the

vehicle

by some secure means. Lowder’s

secure or otherwise; rather, the plate

Lowder conceded

the plate

was

plate

resting

was not attached

was not fastened

t0 the vehicle

0n the dashboard between

it

by any means,

and the windshield.

Further, the “clearly Visible”

to the vehicle.

requirement unambiguously requires the license plate be in a place and position t0 be easily seen
in a clear

Lowder’s license plate could not be seen by Deputy Payne when he

manner.

Additionally, the district court found (and

approached the vehicle.

Lowder has not challenged
Because the

the ﬁnding) that the plate’s location obscured a substantial portion 0f the plate.

statute

unambiguously requires

Visible,

and Lowder’s plate was not attached

seen, the statute

is

that the plate

the statute failed t0 provide

prevent this Violation. .or even t0
.

That assertion

is

I

know the

directly contradicted

Violation 0f the statute.

As

to the vehicle

by any means and could not be

Deputy Payne

was approaching

have a front plate.”

him with

Violation

was

fair notice

ﬁx

by the evidence. Lowder was

clearly

aware he was in

Lowder stated “I know, I know, I don’t
show me the license plate was in front 0f the

the vehicle, Mr.

He proceeded

Lowder

to

testiﬁed:

t0

the license plate and that he

(TL, p.9, Ls.4-10.)

and he had “no way

occurring.”5 (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-

driver in the corner, kind ofjust in the front Windshield.
ties t0

readily

not unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Lowder argues

16.)

be securely fastened to the vehicle and clearly

would

recollected telling

get

it

ﬁxed

He
as

stated that he

had zip

soon as possible.

Deputy Payne something

similar:

“I’m sure you

5

Lowder hypothesizes that “an external factor” such as “the sun’s glare 0r even the ofﬁcer’s poor
eyesight would transform a secured and clearly Visible plate into one which violates Idaho law.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.16-17.) Beyond the fact that this proposition is baseless, his challenge t0
the statute

is

as applied.

Therefore, this Court looks t0 his conduct in this case, not Whatever

hypothetical conduct he can provide.

E

444 P.3d at 882 (“When
be unconstitutionally vague should not be

Co_0k, 165 Idaho at 310,

analyzing vagueness, the words 0f a statute alleged to

evaluated in the abstract, but should be considered in reference t0 the particular conduct of the

defendant challenging the statute.” (alteration and quotation marks omitted)).
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me

stopped
help.”

—

(TL, p.29, L.24

only had

fair notice

p.30, L.2.)

front of the vehicle.

have zip

I

ties if that will

Lowder’s comments to Deputy Payne demonstrate he not

but was in fact aware that his plate was neither securely fastened nor clearly

Therefore,

Visible.

on the

for the license plate not being

he

has

failed

show

to

that

either

requirement

of the

statute

is

unconstitutionally vague as applied.

Not Warranted Because The Evidence Was Attenuated
From The Allegedly Unlawful Trafﬁc Stop BV Deputy Payne’s Discovery Of A Valid

Alternatively, Suppression Is

E.

Pre-Existing Warrant For Lowder’s Arrest

Even
The

if this

Court determines the trafﬁc stop was unlawful, suppression

“principal judicial

remedy”

for a Violation of the Fourth

unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal

“But the signiﬁcant costs of
to

deem

it

trial.”

Utah

[the exclusionary rule]

‘applicable only. .where
.

Li. (ellipsis in original) (quoting

its

V. Strieff,

have led

[the

V.

Amendment

136

S. Ct.

not warranted.

is

“to exclude

2056, 2061 (2016).

United States Supreme Court]

deterrence beneﬁts outweigh

Hudson

is

its

substantial social costs.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)). The Court has

“accordingly recognized several exceptions” to the exclusionary rule. Li.

One such

exception

is

the attenuation doctrine:

“Evidence

connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence

interrupted

by some intervening circumstance, so

admissible

is

is

that the interest protected

when

the

remote or has been

by

the constitutional

guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression 0f the evidence obtained.”
Li. (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

the exclusionary rule

Where the

the discovery 0f evidence

is

state

The attenuation exception precludes application of

can show “the connection between unlawful conduct and

‘sufﬁciently attenuated to dissipate the taint

9”

0f the Violation.

Li. at

2062. Three factors guide the attenuation analysis: “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct

18

and the acquisition of the evidence,

(2) the occurrence

of intervening circumstances, and

ﬂagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” State

(3) the

Page, 140 Idaho 841,

V.

846, 103 P.3d 454, 459 (2004). Both the second and third factors weigh against suppression.

An

intervening

circumstance

Which

one

is

connection

the

interrupts

6

between

unconstitutional police conduct and the discovery of evidence, “so that ‘the interest protected

the constitutional guarantee that has been violated

evidence obtained.”

M,

136

would not be served by suppression of

2061 (quoting

S. Ct. at

m,

547 U.S.

by
the

The

at 593).

m
m

discovery of a valid pre-existing arrest warrant has been recognized as a sufﬁcient intervening
circumstance.

E

gg, Egg, 140 Idaho

at

846-47, 103 P.3d at 459-60;

ﬂ

211$

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 722, 404 P.3d 659, 664 (2017) (“The discovery of the outstanding
warrant, independent of the stop, compelled Cohagan’s arrest.

search that revealed the drug contraband

Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336,

was lawﬁJI

429 P.3d 877, 889

(Ct.

And

there

is

n0 question

as a search incident to arrest”);

App. 2018) (“Fairchild’s

not conﬁrmed until after the ofﬁcer conducted an unlawful

frisk,

that the

arrest warrant,

While

constitutes an intervening

circumstance that severed the causal chain extending from the unlawful frisk to the discovery of
the second baggie of methamphetamine.”).

In

Egg,

this

Court determined the ofﬁcer unlawfully detained Page, but held suppression

was not warranted due
Idaho

at

t0 the ofﬁcer’s discovery

846-47, 103 P.3d at 459-60.

of a valid pre-existing arrest warrant. Egg, 140

“Clearly, once the ofﬁcer discovered that there

was an

outstanding warrant, an intervening event under Green, he did not have t0 release Page and

6

The

ﬁrst factor carries

n0 weight

in this case.

There was no evidence introduced

suppression hearing regarding the timing 0f the trafﬁc stop, nor has

Lowder argued

was

at the

that the time

elapsed between the allegedly unlawful detention and the discovery 0f methamphetamine
supports suppression.
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justiﬁed in arresting

him

at that point.” Li. (citing

1997)). Further, “[0]nce he

United States

had effectuated a lawful

V.

Green, 111 F.3d 5 15 (7th Cir.

he was clearly justiﬁed in conducting

arrest,

a search incident to arrest....” Li. at 847, 103 P.3d at 460.

“Therefore,

it

was not unlawful

the ofﬁcer t0 seize the drugs discovered incident t0 that arrest” and the evidence

for

was not

suppressible. Li.

Just as in

the discovery of the warrant

Egg,

was an intervening circumstance

that

Lowder but before

attenuated the allegedly unlawful detention from the evidence. After stopping

discovering the evidence, Deputy Payne discovered a valid pre-existing warrant for Lowder’s

arrest.

Thus, Deputy Payne “was justiﬁed in arresting [Lowder]

had effectuated a lawful

arrest,

he was clearly justiﬁed in conducting a search incident to

during which he found methamphetamine.7

E

Egg, 140 Idaho

at 847,

103 P.3d

“[T]he third factor only favors exclusion ‘When the police misconduct

deterrence—that

is,

When

it is

purposeful orﬂagrant.” Cohagan, 162 Idaho

665 (emphasis in original) (quoting

Strieff,

136

S. Ct. at

2062).

demonstrates a reckless disregard for constitutional requirements.
318, 322, 413 P.3d 419, 423 (Ct. App. 2017).

makes a mistake

not ﬂagrant 0r purposeful.

7

However,

“if

is

at

at

arrest,”

460.

most

in

need of

723, 404 P.3d at

Flagrant and improper police

misconduct occurs Where the purpose 0f the law enforcement action

unwittingly” 0r

and “[0]nce he

at that point,”

is

investigatory, systemic, or

E

State V. Fenton, 163 Idaho

an ofﬁcer engages in misconduct

as a result “of an isolated instance of negligence,” the conduct is

Li

Lowder conceded he was

arrested pursuant t0 a pre-existing warrant, (T12, p.34, Ls.19-23;

Appellant’s brief, p2), does not dispute that the warrant was valid, and has not challenged the
lawful search incident t0 arrest.
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This factor weighs against suppression because there was n0 ﬂagrant or purposeful

misconduct. The undisputed evidence demonstrates Deputy Payne stopped Lowder for failing to
properly display a front license plate, and he did so only after conﬁrming

back plate and was therefore subject

Lowder does not

(E

Tr., p.7,

assert that the allegedly unlawful trafﬁc stop

purposeful misconduct and there

assertion.

t0 I.C. § 49-428(2).

is

n0 evidence

was

Lowder had an Idaho

Ls.12-14; p.8, Ls.23-24.)

the result 0f a ﬂagrant or

in the record that

would support such an

Thus, the third factor weighs in favor 0f the state and against suppression.

Because

the discovery 0f the warrant sufﬁciently attenuated the acquisition of evidence from the allegedly

unlawful trafﬁc stop, the evidence
court did not

commit

is

reversible error

admissible and not subject to suppression. Thus, the district

by denying Lowder’s motion

to suppress.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment of the

18th day of December, 2020.

/s/

Kacey L. Jones

KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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district court.
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